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Commentary
Epidemiologic evidence has contributed sub­
stantially to science and to the protection and 
advancement of the public’s health through reg­
ulatory, legal, and medical pathways. Examples 
abound, including tobacco control motivated 
by the discovery that smoking causes a host of 
diseases, evidence­based regulation of environ­
mental and occupational agents shown to cause 
cancer and other diseases, and identification 
of remediable risk factors for coronary heart 
disease. Scrutiny of the methods and results 
of epidemiologic research is often intense and 
sometimes adversarial given its critical contri­
bution to public health, the vested interests 
involved (particularly for occupational and 
environmental causes of disease), and media 
attention. It is well known that observational 
epidemiologic studies may be affected by vari­
ous biases that can impair their validity, and 
that are generally not present in experimental 
investigations. A strength of epidemiology is 
that it is based on real world conditions. Critical 
scrutiny of epidemiologic studies, covering all 
potential sources and mechanisms of biases, is 
indispensable. However, selective listing of evi­
dence and an unbalanced discussion of possible 
methodologic flaws does a disservice to the dis­
cipline and to public health. For example, the 
charge of “false positive” results was misused for 
decades by the tobacco industry to discredit the 
overwhelming epidemiologic evidence linking 
active and passive smoking with cancer (United 
States of America et al. v. Philip Morris USA, 
Inc., et al. 2006). Similarly, reported health 
risks in modern life were ridiculed 20 years ago 
as mistaken menaces indicted by faulty “false 
positive” epidemiology (Feinstein 1988). 
In a series of recent writings, Boffetta and 
coauthors (Boffetta et al. 2008, 2009a, 2009b) 
espouse the viewpoint that “false positive” 
results are a pervasive problem in epidemio­
logic research and, coupled with the tendency 
of epidemiologists to promote new findings, 
lead to decisions and actions that harm society. 
As a remedy Boffetta et al. argue strongly for 
a fundamental skepticism toward results from 
observational studies. This message could—and 
indeed is clearly intended to—have major sci­
entific and public health implications. As epi­
demiologists involved for many years in the use, 
development, and teaching of epidemiologic 
methods, we believe this view not only is essen­
tially flawed and overstated, but relegates obser­
vational studies to being little more than futile 
exercises to be regarded with skepticism and 
largely useless for decision making in public 
health. This conclusion would be a major blow 
to using  epidemiology to advance public health. 
False Positives and  
False Negatives: Two Faces  
of One Coin
Consider the following hypothetical exam­
ple: Suppose we repeatedly tossed a coin 100 
times and recorded the number of “heads” 
and “tails.” About half of the time, the 
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Background: As an observational science, epidemiology is regarded by some researchers as 
 inherently flawed and open to false results. In a recent paper, Boffetta et al. [Boffetta P, McLaughlin 
JK, LaVecchia C, Tarone RE, Lipworth L, Blot WJ. False-positive results in cancer epidemiology: a 
plea for epistemological modesty. J Natl Cancer Inst 100:988–995 (2008)] argued that “epidemiol-
ogy is particularly prone to the generation of false-positive results.” They also said “the tendency 
to emphasize and over-interpret what appear to be new findings is commonplace, perhaps in part 
because of a belief that the findings provide information that may ultimately improve public health” 
and that “this tendency to hype new findings increases the likelihood of downplaying inconsisten-
cies within the data or any lack of concordance with other sources of evidence.” The authors sup-
ported these serious charges against epidemiology and epidemiologists with few examples. Although 
we acknowledge that false positives do occur, we view the position of Boffetta and colleagues on 
false positives as unbalanced and potentially harmful to public health. 
oBjective: We aim to provide a more balanced evaluation of epidemiology and its contribution to 
public health discourse. 
discussion: Boffetta and colleagues ignore the fact that false negatives may arise from the very pro-
cesses that they tout as generating false-positive results. We further disagree with their proposition 
that false-positive results from a single study will lead to faulty decision making in matters of public 
health importance. In practice, such public health evaluations are based on all the data available 
from all relevant disciplines and never to our knowledge on a single study. 
conclusions: The lack of balance by Boffetta and colleagues in their evaluation of the impact of 
false-positive findings on epidemiology, the charge that “methodological vigilance is often absent” 
in epidemiologists’ interpretation of their own results, and the false characterization of how epide-
miologic findings are used in societal decision making all undermine a major source of information 
regarding disease risks. We reaffirm the importance of epidemiologic evidence as a critical compo-
nent of the foundation of public health protection. 
key words: epidemiologic methods, false negatives, false positives, hyped findings. Environ Health 
Perspect 117:1809–1813 (2009). doi:10.1289/ehp.0901194 available via http://dx.doi.org/  [Online 
7 October 2009]
Blair et al.
1810 volume 117 | number 12 | December 2009 • Environmental Health Perspectives
number of heads would be > 50% and there 
would be some instances when it was > 60%. 
Could we conclude on the basis of such an 
individual “case study” that found heads more 
frequent than tails that tossing a coin was 
biased toward producing more heads (false 
positives) than tails (false negatives)? Such a 
conclusion would be unjustified unless we 
had complete data. Collection of such data 
would likely show that the number of “false 
positives” (> 50 heads in 100 tosses) was 
about the same as the number of “false nega­
tives,” (< 50 heads) and that the claim of an 
inherent methodologic bias was unjustified. 
Boffetta et al. (2008) discuss a few examples 
of what they consider false­positive findings 
and conclude that false­positive inferences 
are a major plague for epidemiology. Their 
deductive logic is flawed. It is ironic that they 
support their contention that false positives 
are a major problem with only a few anec­
dotal cases. If “false positives” were indeed 
such a widespread and serious problem in 
epidemiologic research, one would expect that 
it would be relatively easy to provide many 
more examples. From a few examples, the 
authors proceed to discuss seven general fac­
tors contributing to false­positive findings. 
We review and comment on these below. 
Multiple comparisons. Boffetta et al. 
(2008) offered developments in genome­wide 
association studies (GWAS) as support for 
their concern about multiple comparisons, 
but without acknowledging the basic differ­
ence between exploratory studies of thou­
sands of genes with few prior hypotheses and 
studies focused on specific disease risk factors 
often with clear potential for adverse effects. 
Concern about multiple statistical testing 
comparisons is not merely a question of num­
ber of comparisons, but also how hypotheses 
and prior probability of associations are for­
mulated (The Welcome Trust Case Control 
Consortium 2007). For example, in a study of 
dioxin and non­Hodgkin lymphoma, multiple 
comparisons would be of less concern because 
of a strong a priori hypothesis. Although sta­
tistical significance testing is used to address 
the potential role of chance in generating par­
ticular findings, estimates of effect from mul­
tiple studies typically drive decision making 
and societal action. Epidemiologic research 
on an issue is a process. Examples provided 
by Boffetta et al. (2008) of initial leads being 
unsupported by additional research demon­
strate how the early phase of this process may 
be set aside after further investigation. 
Subgroup analyses. To reduce the risk of 
false­positive results, Boffetta et al. (2008) sug­
gested that “the strategy for reporting study 
results should be specified before the results 
are known and selective reporting or empha­
sis of statistically significant results based 
on ex post facto subgroup analyses should be 
discouraged.” This is also a well­recognized 
concern. In practice, many scientific studies—
epidemiologic and nonepidemiologic—have 
dual objectives of testing specifically stated 
hypotheses and estimating the size of the 
putative effect, while also conducting more 
exploratory analyses to provide leads for new 
relationships. Following their recommenda­
tion for a priori listing does not reflect current 
practice, which often involves exploration of 
already collected and readily available data. 
The need to follow up any new associations 
with more rigorous and often expensive stud­
ies is well recognized. A rigid application of 
their a priori specification would also be par­
ticularly restrictive and counter to the use of 
consortia and long­term prospective studies to 
evaluate risk factors or outcomes not specified 
at the design stage of the studies. Some of the 
authors (Boffetta et al. 2008) are themselves 
engaged in prospective studies and pooling 
projects and their recommendation belies their 
own practice. 
Information bias and selection bias. All 
standard courses in epidemiologic methods 
caution that these biases may lead to over­ or 
underestimation of risk. Boffetta et al. (2008) 
mentioned only overestimation. In particular, 
it is well established that if misclassification of 
exposure (or disease) is “nondifferential”—that 
it is unrelated to disease status (or exposure 
status)—then the resulting bias will typically be 
toward the null value. Such information bias 
will tend to diminish the size of any observed 
association and is more likely to lead to a 
conclusion of no association than to a false­
positive one. Because nondifferential exposure 
misclassification is a common occurrence, even 
in well­designed epidemiologic studies, its 
consequence would be quite opposite of false­
positive concerns. On balance, epidemiologic 
research that involves misclassified exposure 
data has an inherent bias toward false­negative 
rather than false­positive findings, contrary to 
the arguments of Boffetta et al. (2008).
Confounding. Boffetta et al. (2008) cited 
a statistical simulation showing that uncon­
trolled confounding can account not only for 
relative risks just above 1, but also for risks 
in the 1.5–2.0 range (Fewell et al. 2007). 
Epidemiologists are well aware of the potential 
for confounding to introduce noncausal asso­
ciations and generally take steps in the design 
and analysis phases of research to address 
confounding. Simulations mentioned by the 
authors offer a reminder of the possible con­
sequences of residual confounding. We agree 
that there is a potential for uncontrolled con­
founding; however, its frequency is critical to 
understanding the magnitude of the implied 
problem. Among relevant evidence, studies of 
occupation and lung cancer have found smok­
ing to be a relatively infrequent confounder 
despite the magnitude of the association 
between smoking and lung cancer risk. In this 
specific example, the relative risk of the disease 
of interest (e.g., lung cancer) from the puta­
tive confounder (i.e., smoking) is very large 
and smoking prevalence is known to vary by 
occupation. Yet confounding due to smoking 
of occupational lung cancer risks is in prac­
tice a rare occurrence (Blair et al. 1985, 2007; 
Siemiatycki et al. 1988; Simonato et al. 1988). 
Finally, confounding can both increase and 
decrease relative risks, although the latter pos­
sibility is overlooked by Boffetta et al. (2008). 
Overestimation of effects in initial and/
or small randomized trials. Small (“under­
powered”) randomized trials sometimes gen­
erate statistically significant but false­positive 
results that are later refuted by subsequent 
larger trials. The same may occur in observa­
tional studies. Most major randomized tri­
als today, however, are adequately powered. 
These points are not new, and no evidence 
is provided to indicate that the problem of 
underpowered studies is unappreciated, that 
it is more severe than in other scientific dis­
ciplines, or that it leads to mistaken decisions 
in public health. Unmentioned is the reverse 
problem—a false­negative finding which can 
also occur from an underpowered trial.
Publication bias. As evidence that negative 
studies go unpublished, Boffetta et al. (2008) 
provided one example, dioxin exposure and 
risk of non­Hodgkin’s lymphoma, that shows 
a deficit of small negative studies and an excess 
of small positive ones. There are reasons to 
believe that publication bias may sometimes 
occur, but its frequency is unknown. We 
would note that today researchers are highly 
motivated to publish even negative results 
because of the expense of conducting studies 
and the intense public debate that surrounds 
public health issues. 
Factors Producing False 
Negatives
Although Boffetta et al. (2008) concluded 
that much epidemiologic research on cancer is 
at risk for false­positive findings and incorrect 
causal inference, they ignored mechanisms 
that would tend to produce false­negative 
results. In fact, false negatives can be pro­
duced by many of the same factors that they 
cited as causing false­positive findings, as well 
as by nondifferential misclassification of expo­
sure and disease and use of crude measures of 
association. Nondifferential misclassification, 
unlike other mechanisms of bias, is probably 
always present to some degree in epidemio­
logic studies. Because it tends, on average, 
to reduce the observable risk below the true 
value in cohort and case–control studies, that 
is, to induce false­negative results, this effect 
can be substantial. For example, if 20% of 
workers are exposed to an occupational haz­
ard that produces a real increase in the risk 
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of lung cancer of 50%, a nondifferential mis­
classification arising from an exposure estima­
tion method with sensitivity and specificity 
both equal to 80% will reduce the observable 
increase in lung cancer risk to about 20%. 
A relative risk of 1.2 is in the range where it 
might be difficult to conclude that there is 
an association. Thus, reduction in calculated 
relative risk can be sizable even when sensi­
tivity and specificity are as high as 80%. The 
reduction is likely to be greater in many epi­
demiologic studies evaluating occupational or 
environmental exposures, because few avail­
able exposure classification methods have such 
a high sensitivity and specificity. When more 
than two levels of exposure are evaluated, 
nondifferential misclassification can result 
in an increase in relative risks for exposure 
categories other than the highest (Dosemeci 
et al. 1990). This effect, however, would tend 
to confuse an exposure–response gradient and 
diminish confidence that a true positive asso­
ciation exists. In other words, it would tend 
to lead to false­negative conclusions.
Crude assessments of exposure can also lead 
to underestimation of risk and to false­negative 
conclusions. For example, the relative risk of 
lung cancer in the classic British doctors study 
ranges from 5.6 for regular smokers of 1–4 
cigarettes per day to 50.7 for the smokers of 
35–40 cigarettes (Doll and Peto 1978). A sim­
ple binary categorization of persons as either 
smokers or nonsmokers, however, produces a 
relative risk of 12.0, which greatly underesti­
mates the risk at higher levels of exposure (Doll 
and Peto 1978). In occupational epidemiol­
ogy, classification of exposure as ever versus 
never and duration have often been the only 
available proxies of the actual exposures and 
are typically cruder and weaker exposure scales 
than cumulative or intensity­weighted metrics. 
Imprecise exposure assessment tends to reduce 
relative risks. For example, in the classic study 
by Redmond et al. (1972), the standardized 
mortality ratio (SMR) for lung cancer among 
workers who ever worked in the coke plant at 
a steel mill was 1.7. But this risk was almost 
entirely explained by the risk to a small group 
of workers whose duties kept them on top of 
the coke ovens and for whom the SMR was 
10.0 for those with ≥ 5 years on the job. 
Hyped Findings
Boffetta et al. (2008) claimed that dam­
age caused by false­positive results is further 
enhanced because they are “hyped” by epide­
miologists and the press. We recognize that the 
media may over interpret study findings, regard­
less of the field of research. Of course, legitimate 
differences in interpretation of study results 
may occur among epidemiologists. Boffetta 
et al. (2008) provided no indication as to when 
differences in interpretation between scientists 
should be classified as “hyped” and when they 
are legitimate disagreements. They implied that 
such “hyping” is more common with epide­
miology than with other scientific disciplines, 
but the evidence they provide to support the 
claim is entirely anecdotal. Furthermore, when 
economic interests are at stake, there is ample 
opportunity for the alternative views to be heard 
through press releases from affected groups used 
by the media and the common tendency for 
reporters to seek comments from individuals 
and groups with different points of view. 
For the papers labeled as “hyped” by 
Boffetta et al. (2008), we reviewed how the 
authors of these papers summarized their 
findings.
Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) 
and breast cancer. “These findings suggest that 
environmental chemical contamination with 
organochlorine residues may be an important 
etiologic factor in breast cancer. Given the 
widespread dissemination of organochlorine 
insecticides in the environment and the food 
chain, the implications are far­reaching for 
public health intervention worldwide” (Wolff 
et al. 1993).
Accompanying editorial on the DDT breast 
cancer paper. “These data [Wolff et al. 1993], 
although limited, do suggest the plausibility of 
an association between organochlorines and 
increased risk of breast cancer. However, at 
this stage, these mechanisms are incompletely 
understood, and they will require considerable 
additional refinement before becoming truly 
compelling” (Hunter and Kelsey 1993). Thus, 
the accompanying editorial placed these results 
in the appropriate context. 
Induced abortion and breast cancer. “Our 
data support the hypothesis that an induced 
abortion can adversely influence a woman’s 
subsequent risk of breast cancer. However, the 
results across all epidemiologic studies on this 
premise are inconsistent—both overall and 
within specific subgroups” (Daling et al. 1994).
Pancreatic cancer and coffee. “This asso­
ciation should be evaluated with other data; 
if it reflects a causal relation between coffee 
drinking and pancreatic cancer, coffee use 
might account for a substantial proportion of 
the cases of this disease in the United States” 
(MacMahon et al. 1981).
These summary sentences and the impli­
cations highlighted by the authors vary, but 
none of them claimed that their results pro­
vide sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
association is causal, nor do they call for pub­
lic action. Although the findings of each study 
had potential implications for public health, 
additional publications quickly led to a judg­
ment that a causal association was unlikely, 
thereby confirming the importance of repli­
cation and consistency in inferring causality 
and the value of epidemiologic research in 
generating the evidence base for public health 
protection. 
We do not find obvious evidence of 
hype in the papers so labeled by Boffetta 
et al. (2008). The article with the stron­
gest statement, on breast cancer and DDT, 
was accompanied by an editorial that indi­
cated considerable additional information 
was required before the hypothesis could be 
regarded as “truly compelling.” 
Although we disagree with Boffetta et al. 
(2008) regarding “hype” in the above­men­
tioned articles, this may reflect a genuine dif­
ference in judgment in regard to the strength 
of evidence necessary to make any positive 
statement about a possible association. To 
evaluate this point, we selected papers by 
authors of the Boffetta et al. (2008) com­
mentary on topics with relatively few previ­
ous publications and lack of consensus on 
causation to assess how these authors describe 
conclusions from their own data. 
Antidepressants and non-Hodgkin lym-
phoma. “Our results indicate an increased 
risk of non­Hodgkin’s lymphoma specifically 
among long­term users of tricyclic antidepres­
sant medications” (Dalton et al. 2008). Two 
previous papers on the topic were cited in this 
paper; one was positive and one was negative.
Flavonoids and laryngeal cancer. “This 
study provides support for a beneficial effect 
of selected flavonoids on laryngeal cancer risk” 
(Garavello et al. 2007). The authors cited one 
previous case–control study of 34 laryngeal 
cancer cases, although papers were available 
linking flavonoids with other cancers.
Formaldehyde and laryngeal cancer. “A 
possible link between high formaldehyde 
exposure and laryngeal cancer was suggested” 
(Shangina et al. 2006). There were no previ­
ous studies supporting a link between formal­
dehyde and laryngeal cancer.
Acrylonitrile and lung cancer. “Exposure 
to acrylonitrile was associated in our study 
with risk of lung cancer” (Scelo et al. 2004). 
This association between acrylonitrile and 
lung cancer reported in another paper was 
specifically presented by Boffetta et al. (2008) 
as an example of a hyped false positive. 
We find the interpretative language used 
in previous papers by authors of the Boffetta 
et al. (2008) paper to be no different from 
those cited as examples of “hype.”
In conclusion, the claim by Boffetta et al. 
(2008) for a widespread problem of “hyping” 
is based on anecdotal evidence. In epidemio­
logic terms, they use a few “case reports” (and 
we see little evidence of “hyped” interpreta­
tions in these) to draw a causal connection 
between false positives and hyping. Even if 
this so­called hyping does occur on occasion, 
it is not so widespread as to justify the serious 
charge that epidemiologists do not appropri­
ately evaluate their data and that they actively 
seek to publicize unsubstantiated findings 
in only one direction. Although similar 
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accusations were made 20 years ago (Feinstein 
1988), our accumulated experience today is 
just the opposite. We find that epidemiolo­
gists focus intensively on possible sources of 
bias in individual studies and in their review 
of the evidence. 
Epidemiology: Futile or 
Essential to Public Health 
Decisions?
The argument by Boffetta et al. (2008) on the 
negative impact of false positives on public 
health also rests on a faulty characterization 
of the process of achieving scientific consen­
sus on public health issues. They implied that 
a single false­positive study leads directly to 
some societal action. Only under extraordinary 
circumstances are actions taken on the basis of 
a single study. In our considerable personal 
experience, we find that scientists serving on 
evaluative groups, such as IARC (International 
Agency for Research on Cancer) Monograph 
Working Groups, carefully consider data from 
all relevant scientific disciplines and pay spe­
cial attention to the strengths and weaknesses 
of the many studies being considered. 
Boffetta et al. (2008) were concerned about 
false­positive findings because they “may lead 
to inappropriate government and public health 
decisions, including the introduction of costly 
and potentially harmful measures.” Public 
health actions based on invalid data would be 
a concern. Resources are always limited and 
useless actions might preclude more benefi­
cial activities from being taken elsewhere, but 
they provided no clear examples where this 
has occurred. They also focused only on false­
positive results and ignore the consequences of 
false­negative findings, which may also have 
deleterious societal impacts. The false appear­
ance of a lack of an increase in risk, or of only 
a small increase in risk, may result in inaction 
when action is, in fact, warranted. Failure to 
act may result in avoidable mortality and mor­
bidity, which has human and economic costs 
(e.g., in medical care and lack of economic 
productivity). Another serious consequence 
that is rarely addressed is that false­negative 
findings may not motivate replication. In con­
trast, a new positive finding tends to generate 
scientific interest and activity, and the true 
relationship will ultimately be elucidated. This 
was aptly demonstrated in the previously men­
tioned association reported between coffee and 
pancreatic cancer (MacMahon et al. 1981), 
which was quickly evaluated in several other 
studies and, in fact, not confirmed.
Conclusions
We find that the commentary by Boffetta et al. 
(2008) offers an unbalanced view of false­
 positive results in epidemiologic research and 
an overinterpretation of their consequences 
for public health. We have documented the 
lack of evidence in support of their arguments. 
Their commentary rhetorically attacks a “straw 
man” that the authors have themselves erected 
based on a few selected examples, which are 
extrapolated to the conclusion that “false­pos­
itive results are a common problem” and that 
“users of epidemiological results outside the 
scientific community … should be aware of 
the fact that statistically significant or positive 
results are often false.”
This dismissal of epidemiology fails on 
two crucial points with regard to its actual 
practice. First, epidemiologic evidence is usu­
ally considered in a context of relevant find­
ings from other scientific disciplines during 
evaluations of topics of public health signifi­
cance. Thus, a careful interpretation of the 
results from any epidemiologic investigation 
calls for examination of the findings in the 
light of all available scientific evidence. In fact, 
decisions made by regulatory agencies and 
public health–oriented institutions like IARC 
are based on minimizing the impact of both 
false­positive and false­negative results and 
on a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant 
scientific data, not just epidemiology (IARC 
2008). Moreover, conclusions of the IARC 
Monographs establishing human carcinoge­
nicity of an exposure have never been based, 
to our knowledge, on a single study. Thus, the 
concern by Boffetta et al. (2008) that false­
positive findings from an epidemiologic study 
would lead to “inappropriate governmental 
and public health decisions” postulates a sce­
nario that seems unlikely and certainly was 
not documented by any examples offered. 
Second, decisions for societal action, 
whether in clinical medicine, public health, 
or politics, must necessarily be based on the 
totality of evidence available at the time of 
decision. In an exchange of letters subsequent 
to publication of their 2008 paper, Boffetta 
et al. (2009a) stated that 
committee reports and their conclusions in them­
selves should not be misconstrued as science: they 
are consensus documents and opinions with an 
eye towards closure. In contrast, science is inher­
ently open­ended, provisional in its findings and 
conclusions. 
This is correct, but decisions must be based 
on the evidence currently in hand. As stated by 
Hill (1965), 
in asking for very strong evidence I would, how­
ever, repeat emphatically that this does not imply 
crossing every ‘t’, and swords with every critic, 
before we act. … All scientific work is incom­
plete—whether it be observational or experi­
mental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or 
modified by advancing knowledge. That does not 
confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge 
we already have, or to postpone the action that it 
appears to demand at a given time.
Skepticism toward epidemiologic results and 
open­ended waiting for action until a final 
truth emerges that is satisfactory to all seg­
ments of society will guarantee only that 
important actions are delayed, as the his­
tory of the successful efforts of the tobacco 
industry to retard anti­smoking actions clearly 
demonstrates. Although science should heed 
proper skepticism, it should not do so to such 
an extent that new ideas are stifled. It is of 
interest that in the alleged spirit of epistemo­
logic modesty, such slogans as “sound science” 
and “evidence­based toxicology” have been 
put forward by professionals with a record 
of collaboration with the tobacco industry 
(Guzelian et al. 2005). The purpose has clearly 
been to dismiss evidence from animal models 
and only accept “conclusive” epidemiology on 
risks in humans (Ruden and Hansson 2008), 
effectively cutting off a line of important evi­
dence for risk assessment. Epidemiology is 
an important research component of public 
health. Boffetta et al. (2008) appear to relegate 
it to the role of a futile exercise producing sci­
entific papers of doubtful utility, whose results 
should be regarded with such skepticism that 
they can be comfortably exempted from policy 
and practice implications and decisions. We 
reject this contention on scientific grounds 
and believe that it would be damaging to 
public health and to society at large. It is the 
responsibility of epidemiologists to design and 
conduct studies in a way that makes them 
capable of assisting public health and clinical 
decisions. We also believe that an evaluation 
of epidemiologic findings based on a balanced 
weighing of potentials for false­positive and 
false­negative biases along with other consid­
erations of strengths and weaknesses within 
the framework of all other pertinent scientific 
evidence can and does produce valid scientific 
knowledge essential to public health actions 
and to advancement of science.
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